Showing posts with label Prosper of Aquitaine. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Prosper of Aquitaine. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 24, 2009

Aetius and the Fall of the First Burgundian Kingdom

The Rise of Aetius

After the fall of Stilicho in A.D. 408, the Roman empire had decided to secure military assistance from a non-Germanic source and made a treaty with the Huns, which included the exchange of hostages. One of these was a young Roman named Aetius. By A.D. 425 he had been freed, but his familiarity with the Huns prompted the usurper John (or Joannes), who was in desperate need of military help to ward off an attack at Ravenna, to send Aetius to the Huns with the objective of hiring an army.

Unfortunately for John, Aetius arrived too late to save him, but Aetius was later successful in persuading the Huns to leave Italy in return for booty and hostages. As a result of this remarkable diplomacy, Placidia and Valentinian III forgave him for fighting against them and gave him an imperial title.

In A.D. 432
, Aetius lost to his rival Boniface of Africa in a battle fought near Ariminum. Though he returned to his estate, he maintained enough military strength to preclude an open attack from his enemies. However, Boniface’s son-in-law, Sebastian, attempted to have Aetius assassinated. The failed attempt on his life prompted Aetius to leave his estates and he eventually found his way to the Huns, ruled at that time by Rua. Aetius made a treaty with the Huns in which he handed over Pannonia Prima and also sent his own son, Carpilio, as a hostage. With his new Hun allies, Aetius secured his own position in the Empire and faced down Sebastian, becoming a patrician. He turned repeatedly to his Hun allies to assist him in protecting Gallo-Roman interests.

The Destruction of the First Burgundian Kingdom

Aetius often pitted barbarians against each other for the benefit of Rome. This policy was common, as Roman Emperors were reticent to rely on Roman armies because of a fear of civil war. Imperial authorities had long forbidden men of senatorial rank from joining the army and relied upon the populace in the cities to keep the economy moving. As a result, most of the city and country population of the Roman Empire had nothing to do with the military and the best, and only, recruits left were the barbarians.

The Burgundians were one of the first Germanic tribes against whom Aetius marched, with the goal of preventing their further encroachment on Roman soil. Hydatius wrote, “The Burgundians, who had rebelled, were defeated by the Romans under the general Aetius.” According to Prosper of Aquitaine, “Aetius crushed [Gundahar], who was king of the Burgundians and living in Gaul. In response to his entreaty, Aetius gave him peace, which the king did not enjoy for long. For the Huns destroyed him and his people root and branch.” Various other chronicles put the date of these events in the same approximate time frame, and all lay the defeat of the Burgundians at the feet of Aetius and the Huns.

That Aetius and the Huns both attacked the Burgundians has not been disputed. Whether the Huns proceeded with their attack at the bidding of the Roman general, or did so for other reasons, remains unknown. A comparison of the accounts given in the chronicles only adds to the confusion. Hydatius credited Aetius, or forces under his command, for defeating the Burgundians in both A.D. 436 and A.D. 437, while another anonymous chronicler only mentioned that Aetius was responsible defeating the Burgundians in A.D. 436 and made no mention of a second confrontation. Yet, it was the aforementioned account of Prosper of Aquitaine, who lived during the time of the events, which may provide a hint as to what really occurred.

Prosper clearly separated the two attacks upon the Burgundians as well as those responsible. This does not exclude the possibility that the Huns were acting on behalf of Aetius. If true, then it seems likely that Aetius broke his peace with the Burgundians and their spectacular defeat could have resulted from a mistaken belief that they were at peace. In short, they weren’t prepared for war, especially in a weakened state. However, another interpretation of Prosper’s account would indicate that the two separate attacks were committed by different forces and implies differing motivations on the part of each aggressor. Aetius’s motivation was clear. He sought to protect the Gallic aristocracy from Burgundian encroachment. The reasons behind a Hunnic attack are more difficult to determine.

It has been suggested that the Huns may have had their own reasons for attacking the Burgundians. Some contemporary writers wrote that a portion of the Burgundians had not crossed the Rhine with the bulk of their people. Instead, they remained on the eastern shore of the Rhine, in the region between it, the Main, and the Neckar rivers. According to the ecclesiastical historian Socrates, around A.D. 430, these Burgundians were suffering continuous attacks by the Huns, with devastating results.

Apparently, they spurned their traditional, but ineffective, gods and turned to the Christian god for help. According to the story, their prayers were answered when Uptar, the king of this branch of the Huns, exploded, and subsequently died, as a result of a night of overindulgence. (The death of the Arian heretic Arius is another example of this kind of expiration, though Arius could be said to have "shat himself to death", so to speak. Taking Socrates’ examples, it seems prayers were often answered with this sort of explosive result!). Uptar's leaderless tribe of 10,000 was then easily defeated by a force of only 3,000 Burgundians. Finally, because of this stunning victory, the Burgundians became devout Christians.

While this is undoubtedly a conversion story, some details are verified in other sources. Uptar is probably the same person as Octar, the brother of Rua, king of the Huns, who assisted Aetius. Additionally, the relatively small number of warriors engaged in the battle was notable given that the account was written by an ecclesiastical historian, clerics usually given to inflating the size of medieval military forces! Given this, it can be theorized that a group of Huns, led by the brother of Rua, regularly ravaged the Burgundians but were eventually, and unexpectedly, defeated by their one-time victims. As such, the acts later attributed to the Huns, whether singly or at the behest of Aetius, may have been the result of a desire for revenge. However, and perhaps more simply, it could also be a case of a strong Hun army attacking a weak neighbor for booty and treasure. They would not have needed the blessing, or prompting, of Aetius to embark on such a campaign.

Regardless of their motivation, the Huns were effective in reducing the Burgundians “to manageable dimensions, the manner in which this was done becoming a main theme of bardic recitation.” It was such a remarkable event that it was mentioned by several of the extant chroniclers. This “bardic recitation” eventually became known as the Nibelungenlied. As such, the fall of the Burgundians may have inspired legend, but whether the Huns caused their downfall remains a subject for debate. Finally, the encounter with the Huns may have not only inspired an epic tale, but also, shortly after this time (according to some archaeologists), the Burgundians began to emulate the look of their conquerors as they copied Hunnic fashion and even practiced cranial deformation (though that was not a uniquely "Hun" thing to do).


UP NEXT:
Germanic Myth and the Burgundians

SOURCES:

E.A. Thompson,
A History of Attila and the Huns (London: Oxford University Press, 1948; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975), 65 (page citations are to the reprint edition).
Musset, Germanic Invasions.
Hydatius
, in Murray, Merovingian Gaul.
Prosperi Tironis
, in Murray, Merovingian Gaul.
Chronicle of 452
, in Murray, Merovingian Gaul.
Walter Goffart, “Rome, Constantinople, and the Barbarians,” The American Historical Review 86, no.2 (1981).
H. Baynes, “A Note on Professor Bury’s ‘History of the Later Roman Empire’,” The
Journal of Roman Studies
12 (1922).
Socrates, vii, 30, in Thompson, A History of Attila and the Huns.
Socrates Scholasticus, The Ecclesiastical History of Socrates Scholasticus, in Socrates and Sozomenus: Ecclesiastical Histories, rev. A.C. Zenos, A Select library of Nicene and post-Nicene fathers of the Christian church : Second series, ed. and trans. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, vol. 2, (New York: The Christian Literature Company, 1890).
J.M. Wallace-Hadrill, The Barbarian West, 400-1000 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1999).

Monday, June 8, 2009

The First Kingdom of the Burgundians

As the empire grew, Rome demanded the provincial landowners pay higher municipal assessments. These landowners passed as much of this burden as they could onto the tenant farmers and slaves on their lands, who, with no other recourse, would sometimes revolt against their landowners. Thus, brigandage (armed rebellion) spread, and the landowners, now often without sufficient workers on their lands, were still required to pay the assessments, regardless of their own ability to collect taxes.

These "brigands" viewed Rome as a greater threat than barbarian incursion and, when faced with the inability of the former to deal adequately with the latter, resorted to raising their own commanders to deal with the problems of rebellion and barbarian raids. When these champions were successful, they would further be raised as emperors, as in the case of Cassius Latinus Postumus and his Gallic Empire from A.D. 259 to A.D. 273.

These events foreshadowed a growing attitude among the provincial Romans. They were more concerned with their immediate welfare than with maintaining a remote ideal of a united Roman empire and, when faced with chaos, turned to whomever could provide immediate relief. Self-interest won out over idealism. In the fifth century this attitude became the norm.

On December 31, 406, Vandals and Alans crossed the Rhine and entered Gaul to raid, pillage and burn. Shortly thereafter, about A.D. 407, the Burgundians filled the vacuum created by the departure of the Vandals and moved down the Main River and ravaged Strassburg, Speier and Worms in the process. They fought and pushed out the Alamanni and occupied new territory on both sides of the Rhine by A.D. 411.

As an aside, Ralph Mathisen--in Roman Aristocrats--has explained that Ausonius, Jerome in A.D. 406, Nazarius in the early fourth century, Sidonius in the fifth century (twice), and Avitus of Vienne in the 6th century all gave approximately the same list of barbarian tribes who they said invaded the empire. These lists indicated no uniquely identifying quality for any of these groups and the frequent mention of the same list seems to indicate that it was a standard litany used to illustrate that there were barbarians invading the empire.

Further, Katherine Fischer Drew is one of many who points to the Greek historian Socrates’ assertion that the Burgundians crossed the Rhine to pursue their primary trade of carpentry and woodworking. This seems a curious passage, though it may have a grain of truth. Perhaps the Burgundians were known for their woodworking talents, though no other evidence to support this can be found in the sources

Traditionally, the Burgundian establishment in this region has been called the Kingdom of Worms, apparently in an attempt to align history with the tales of the Nibelungenlied. In fact, the kingdom was said to be located on the Rhine, downstream of Koblenz, in Roman province of Germania II rather than Germania I. As a result of this historiographical argument, some scholars began referring to it as the Rhenish kingdom of the Burgundians.

During this time, the Roman imperial claimant Constantine III (A.D. 409-411) had entered the Rhone valley. He encountered certain barbarian tribes, often believed to have been Burgundians and Alamanni. At that time, Constantine made some sort of mutually beneficial agreement with these tribes, which they later violated. Further, it seems both groups, the barbarians and Constantine, continued to operate independently of each other in the region, in a sort of acquiescence of feigned ignorance. It seems apparent that if the Burgundians did indeed drive the Alamanni out of territory they occupied, then the two groups may also have had a falling out.

After Constantine III was killed, Jovinus (A.D. 411-412), a Gallo-Roman in northern Gaul, was raised as emperor with the support of the Burgundians. It has also been suggested that Roman officials who had previously supported Constantine III also supported Jovinus. This support of Jovinus for Emperor by the Burgundians was an attempt to strengthen their position within the wider Roman Empire. However, the reign of Jovinus was brief, and the Burgundian’s role as imperial power brokers proved a temporary one. Athaulf and his Visigoths eventually killed Jovinus at the behest of Rome in A.D. 413.

Peter Heather has explained that it was common practice for barbarian groups to attempt to strengthen their position within the Empire by supporting rebellion when the opportunity arose. They respected the strength of Rome too much to strike out on their own, in the open, to set up an independent state by directly usurping land from the Roman Empire. In this, the barbarian tribes and their leaders were just one of the multiple players in Late Antique imperial politics, which included various Roman political and ecclesiastical factions. And, as Ralph Mathisen has noted, however, these factions were just as, if not more, involved in the rise and fall of the various “tyrannical” emperors as were the barbarian groups and their kings.

During this time, the Roman imperial claimant Constantine III (A.D. 409-411) had entered the Rhone valley. He encountered certain barbarian tribes, often believed to have been Burgundians and Alamanni. At that time, Constantine made some sort of mutually beneficial agreement with these tribes, which they later violated. Further, it seems both groups, the barbarians and Constantine, continued to operate independently of each other in the region, in a sort of acquiescence of feigned ignorance.

It seems apparent that if the Burgundians did indeed drive the Alamanni out of territory they occupied, then the two groups may also have had a falling out. After Constantine III was killed, Jovinus (A.D. 411-412), a Gallo-Roman in northern Gaul, was raised as emperor with the support of the Burgundians. It has also been suggested that Roman officials who had previously supported Constantine III also supported Jovinus. This support of Jovinus for Emperor by the Burgundians was an attempt to strengthen their position within the wider Roman Empire. However, the reign of Jovinus was brief, and the Burgundian’s role as imperial power brokers proved a temporary one. Athaulf and his Visigoths eventually killed Jovinus at the behest of Rome in A.D. 413.

After the fall of Jovinus, Prosper of Aquitaine wrote that the Burgundians “acquired part of Gaul near the Rhine.” Prior to their support of Jovinus, Constantine III had confirmed the Burgundians in their possession of the land they had seized along the Rhine. The new emperor, Honorius, accepted them as Federates of the Empire (foederati), probably more out of necessity than desire. As such, in A.D. 413, they were established along the Rhine and pledged to guard the empire against its enemies. This was the first Burgundian kingdom in Gaul, under their king, Gundahar.

UP NEXT: The Conversion of the Burgundians

SOURCES:

Geary, The Myth of Nations.
Mathisen, Roman Aristocrats in Barbarian Gaul.
Prosperi Tironis epitoma chronicon, ed. Th. Mommsen, Chronica Minora I, MGH AA 9 (1892), 385-485. trans. A.C. Murray, in From Roman to Merovingian Gaul: A Reader, ed. and trans. Alexander Callander Murray (Orchard Park, NY: Broadview Press, 2000).
L. Schmidt, Geschichte der Wandalen, 1901 in Bury, Later Roman Empire.
Heather, “The Huns...,” The English Historical Review.
Robert Latouche, “Agriculture in the Early Middle Ages,” in The Barbarian Invasions: Catalyst of a New Order, ed. Katherine Fischer Drew (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970).
Musset, Germanic Invasions.
Orosius, Historiae adv. Paganos, edited by Zangemeister (1889) and E.A. Freeman, Western Europe in the Fifth Century (1904) in Bury, Later Roman Empire.
Chronica Gallica A. CCCCLII, ed. Th. Mommsen, Chronica Minor I, MGH AA 9 (1892), 646-62, trans. by A.C. Murray, in Murray, Merovingian Gaul, 81. (hereafter cited as Chronicle of 452).
Prosperi Tironis, in Murray, Merovingian Gaul.
Gregory of Tours, The History of the Franks, trans. with an introduction by Lewis Thorpe (London: Penguin Books, 1974).
Mathisen, Roman Aristocrats.
Mathisen, “Proculus, Patroclus, and Pelagianism: The Gallic Church in the Age of the Tyrants,” in Ecclesiastical Factionalism and Religious Controversy in Fifth-Century Gaul, (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University Press, 1989).
The Chronicle of Hydatius and the Consularia Constantinopolitana, ed. and trans. Richard W. Burgess (Oxford, 1993), trans. A.C. Murray, in Murray, Merovingian Gaul.