Friday, May 8, 2009

Burgundians in the Accounts of Ammianus and Orosius


Under Diocletian (A.D. 284-305), the military was restructured, and two types of legions were created. The first, the limitanei, was composed of garrison troops along the heavily defended frontier and was composed mostly of ill-trained and ill-equipped local troops. The comitatenses, a mobile and more skilled field army, was rushed to assist these local border guards when emergency occurred. The limitanei gradually became composed of local soldiers who were the sons of soldiers and the line between barbarian and Roman was blurred. The comitatenses also filled its ranks with barbarian recruits.

Roughly eighty years after the Burgundian encounter with Probus, Ammianus Marcellinus wrote that, in A.D. 359, the Burgundian lands were located next to the Alamanni in a “region called Capillacii or Palas where boundary stones marked the frontiers of the Alamanni and Burgundians.” This placed the Burgundians somewhere east of the Alamanni, between the upper Rhine and Danube, possibly on the other side of the Roman limes that had been deserted in the third century.

Ammianus also wrote that the Burgundians knew that they were descendants of the Romans from ancient times and that he believed they had descended “from the Romans whom Drusus, and later Tiberius, left behind on the Elbe and elsewhere to defend the frontier.” That they did descend from Romans was possible given the aforementioned frontier garrison policies of Diocletian. Additionally, as Patrick Geary observes, although Ammianus’ Burgundians may have formed in the fourth century, they maintained names and traditions linking them to ancient people of an earlier time and transferred this identity through various social formations.

Paulus Orosius, writing around A.D. 417, also mentioned that the Burgundians were in this region along the Rhine during this period. According to Orosius, around the year A.D. 367, the Burgundians, “a new name for a new enemy” numbered 80,000 armed men who had settled on the Rhine (John Bagnall Bury believed that the 80,000 number reflected, at most, the population of the entire tribe, not the number of warriors). Orosius generally confirmed Ammianus’s theory of Burgundian descent, though this may indicate he used Ammianus as a source. Orosius added that these camps were in the interior of Germany and that the Germans had been dispersed to different camps, a possible reference to Vopiscus’s account of Probus’s policy towards the Burgundians.

By A.D. 367, some of these people dispersed by Probus “came together to form a great nation and so even took their names from their work, because their frequent dwelling places” along the limes where they had settled and “assumed possession” were called “burgi.” As has been shown, it is possible that some unknown chief, perhaps with a legitimate ancestral claim to a Burgundian genealogy, had united these people.

In A.D. 369, the Emperor Valentinian I (A.D. 364-375) had recurring problems controlling the Alamanni and he asked for assistance from the Burgundians, “a warlike people, rich in a countless number of strong warriors, and therefore a cause of terror to all their neighbours.” Valentinian sent secret letters that asked them to take part in a coordinated attack against the Alamanni. (Writing in the seventh century, the historian Fredegar said that, under Valentinian I, the Gallo-Romans invited the Burgundians so that they could stop paying taxes. Walter Goffart points out that, while this could be the reason why the Burgundians were in the region at that time, the likelihood of Fredegar’s claim was probably influenced more by contemporary, rather than historical, events). Valentinian's plan called for the Burgundians to proceed with an initial attack and he and his Roman armies would support them by crossing the Rhine to prevent any Alamanni from escaping.

Ammianus indicated that the Burgundians were amenable to these entreaties by the Emperor for two reasons. The first was because the Burgundians and Alamanni were traditional rivals. They frequently fought over important salt pits and the Burgundians saw this opportunity as a way to solidify their control of these valuable assets. The second reason ascribed by Ammianus was an alleged sense of kinship that the Burgundians felt toward the Romans, which recalled Ammianus’ earlier assertions regarding the Burgundian heritage. (Herwig Wolfram observed that Ammianus’ feeling of closeness toward the Burgundians, owing to a shared romanitas, kept him from dismissing the unique Burgundian form of kingship as barbaric and instead elicited a comparison to the "sacral responsibility of Egyptian pharaohs").

The Burgundians sent their best warriors on the campaign and fought the Alamanni to the Rhine before the Romans had even put their forces in the field. The delay was caused by the Emperor’s preoccupation with fortifying the frontier. This presumably distracted him from forming his army in time to support the Burgundians, as he had pledged. The sight of Burgundian war parties opposite the Rhine apparently caused fear among the Roman citizens. According to Ammianus, the Burgundians saw the panic they had caused and halted. They waited on the opposite shore for word from Valentinian.

When neither Valentinian nor his forces appeared to be readying for war, the
Burgundians believed, rightly, that he had reneged on his bargain. They decided to return to their homelands, but first sent envoys to him to demand that he, at the very least, protect their retreat against the Alamanni still in the region. Apparently, Valentinian refused to address these envoys “and when they perceived that by subterfuges and delays their request was practically denied, they went off from there in sorrow and indignation.” The Burgundian kings were informed by their envoys of Valentinian’s disrespectful treatment and were greatly enraged. They proceeded to kill all of the Alamanni prisoners they had captured and returned to their lands. Ammianus further explained that the Burgundians had weakened the Alamanni to such an extent that, the following year, Theodosius, commander of the cavalry in Gaul, seeing that the Alamanni had scattered in fear of the Burgundians, attacked them, killed many and sent the prisoners to Italy.

Ammianus also offered a description of the Burgundian leadership:

In their country a king is called by the general name Hendinos, and, according to an ancient custom, lays down his power and is deposed, if under him the fortune of war has wavered, or the earth has denied sufficient crops; just as the Egyptians commonly blame their rulers for such occurrences. On the other hand the chief priest among the Burgundians is called Sisistus, holds his power for life, and is exposed to no such dangers as threaten the kings.

According to Ammianus, then, the dualistic Germanic leadership structure was in evidence among the Burgundians in the late fourth century. However, it seems that the hendinos was clearly in charge of military matters and seemed to have been held responsible for the general welfare of the tribe. The sisistus (or sinistus) appeared to be a holy man who could probably trace his ancestry back to the tribe’s founders. His position was more ceremonial. He had been a “king by noble birth” (rex ex nobilitate) and had been the leader of a smaller, essentially ethnically homogeneous society. The hendinos had earned his position by his action and led a more diverse, and presumably larger, army.

Those from the royal line of the sisistus were not necessarily excluded from becoming a hendinos. Should a line fail by being surpassed in deeds by one from another family, it was often the case that a new royal family, and often a tribe with new ethnic elements, would co-opt the ancient origin of an established people. This was probably how such tribal names as the Burgundians were kept alive. As the ancient tribal kingship model was replaced by the warrior king of migrating armies, the latter was forced to assume many of the political, or official, duties formally assigned to the sisistus. However, with greater power came greater responsibility, and the reverse, such that the sisustus was relatively secure in his position while the hendinos was often held directly accountable for the welfare of the tribe, regardless of his culpability. Thus, it seems apparent that, according to Ammianus’ observations, by this time the Burgundian dux, the hendinos, had gained the preeminent position of authority among the Burgundians.

All that being said, a cautionary note. Ian Wood has explained that Ammianus Marcellinus’:

...famous description of sacral kingship among the Burgundians…demands cautious treatment. Ammianus compares the Burgundian system with that in use in Egypt. But Egypt did not have sacral kingship in the late fourth century A.D. This suggests that Ammianus is quoting a much earlier source. Whatever the source was, the evidence cannot be used at face value for a study of Burgundian kingship just before the migrations.


UP NEXT: The First Burgundian Kingdom

SOURCES:

Geary, The Myth of Nations.
Ammianus, The History.
Heather, in “The Huns and the End of the Roman Empire in Western Europe,” The English Historical Review .
Geary, Before France and Germany.
Paulus Orosius, The Seven Books of History Against the Pagans, trans. Roy J. Deferrari, vol. 50, The Fathers of the Church (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1964).
J.B. Bury, History of the Later Roman Empire: From the Death of Theodosius I to the Death of Justinian (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1958).
Fredegar, Chronicles, 2.46 (MGH Script. Rer. Merov., vol 2).
Goffart, Barbarians and Romans.
Wolfram, Germanic Peoples.
Ian Wood, “Kings, Kingdoms and Consent,” in Early Medieval Kingship, eds. P.H. Sawyer and I.N. Wood (University of Leeds, 1977).

Sunday, May 3, 2009

Probus and the Burgundians

The Burgundians moved westward sometime in the middle of the third century. They apparently took advantage of the chaos caused by the civil wars in the Roman Empire following the murder of Maximinus in A.D. 238. Around A.D. 274, the Burgundians were among tribes that raided Gaul and sacked Trier and other towns. Writing in the fourth century, the historian Vopiscus mentioned an encounter between the Emperor Probus (A.D. 276-282) and a group of Germans near the Rhine. (Before proceeding, please note that the validity of the written sources for this period--particularly the Historia Augusta--have been called into question and, at the least, vigoriously debated).

Zosimus, a Greek historian who wrote at the turn of the sixth century and relied upon earlier accounts, mentioned that the group of Germans attacked by Probus included both Burgundians and Vandals. Zosimus described that, in A.D. 277, Probus set out to reclaim Gaul from the Germans who had seized it. Though he had inferior numbers, Probus used a combination of taunting and tactics to prevail over his Germanic adversaries, killing many and driving the rest back over the Neckar River and beyond the Swabian Alb.

Probus was not content merely to defeat them in a single battle, however, and he proceeded to strengthen the frontier along the Rhine to assist in making a more lasting impression upon the Germans. He built garrisoned camps on barbarian soil and provided supporting infrastructure, in the form of farms, houses, and storehouses. He also provided rations of grain for these troops beyond the Rhine.

Some historians are not sure of linking these archaeological finds specifically with the settlements Probus purportedly established, nor of their being long-term. For instance, H. Schonberger didn't think the evidence supported such a theory, however, he also noted that

...similar action must often have been taken before; any partial occupation of the right bank at this time, however, cannot have lasted long. It would fit the evidence well if the area between the Rhine, the Danube and the limes had formed a sort of no-man’s land from 259-60 until about 300. It is then that the Germans first begin to leave tangible archaeological traces in this area.

For that matter, Malcolm Todd observed that archaeology has shown that the Celts and Germans were not so ethnically distinct as portrayed by Tacitus and Caesar and that the Rhine as a dividing line between the two cultures was not only misleading, but it obscured a third people who were neither definitively Celtic nor Germanic, though they were culturally similar.

Setting aside the archaeological debate, sources indicate that, thus strengthened, Probus continued to fight the barbarians and set a price for each head delivered to him. He only stopped when, according to Vopiscus, “nine princes of different tribes came before him and prostrated themselves at his feet.” Probus made a series of demands of these Germans, including a requirement that they supply him with hostages, grain, and livestock. He ordered them to lay down their swords because they would not need them as they were under the protection of Rome. With the consent of the barbarian princes, he severely punished those who had not given back booty.

Not all agreed to Probus’s demands. Zosimus gave the name of a certain Igullus as being the leader of the Germans who refused to surrender their plunder, though whether he was a Burgundian or Vandal was not clear. According to Zosimus, Probus took Igullus and many recalcitrant Burgundians captive and shipped them to Britain where they settled and put down rebellions on Rome's behalf. Vopiscus confirmed that Probus took prisoners, and he also wrote that Probus took sixteen thousand recruits that he then dispersed throughout the provinces, placing small detachments of fifty or sixty among the soldiers along the reestablished frontier.

Vopiscus asserted that Probus scattered these men in this surreptitious manner because he believed “that the aid that Romans received from barbarian auxiliaries must be felt but not seen.” Further, Vopiscus detailed a letter written by Probus and sent to members of the Roman senate in which Probus declared that “all of Germany . . . has now been subdued, and nine princes of different tribes have lain suplliant [sic] and prostrate at my feet, or, I should say, at yours . . . [the barbarians] plough for you, plant for you, and serve against the more distant tribes.”



UP NEXT: The Burgundians in the Accounts of Ammianus and Orosius

SOURCES:

Bernard S. Bachrach, “Burgundians,” in Dictionary of the Middle Ages.
Anthony King, Roman Gaul and Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
Flavius Vopiscus, Probus, trans. David Magie in The Scriptores Historiae Augustae, vol.3, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1932).
Zosimus, Historia Nova, trans. James J. Buchanan and Harold T. Davis (San Antonio, TX: Trinity University Press, 1967).
H. Schonberger, “The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey,” The Journal of Roman Studies 59, no. ½ (1969).
Malcolm Todd, Everyday Life of The Barbarians.

Monday, April 27, 2009

The End of the Limes

The Rhine-Danube limes was short-lived, though it withstood the Marcomannic Wars of A.D. 166-175 and A.D. 178-180. When not trading with the Romans, the Germans were less concerned with destroying the frontiers of the Rhine and Danube than with raiding the lands beyond them. The garrisons along the limes were systematically weakened by both these attacks and troop withdrawals to other areas of need. By A.D. 259-60, the barbarians had for the most part succeeded in pushing the Romans out of the frontier lands. Historian C.D. Gordon remarked:

What Roman armies there were, were employed mostly in the service of pretenders to the supreme power rather than in the defence [sic] of the frontiers, and it was only diplomatic measures, including the widespread use of subsidization, that for long years preserved what little territorial integrity remained to the Empire… Indeed, all the northern tribes along the Rhine and Danube seem to have been more or less constantly bribed by the weak empire to keep the peace. These subsidies were not backed, however, by any reliable army and so led only to further demands and, when these were not promptly met, to invasion and devastation of all the northern provinces.

This was also true of the situation that led to the invasions of A.D. 406 (but more on that later!).

Rome pushed back when Emperor Gallienus (A.D. 253-268) and his successors defeated the Franks and Alamanni and Aurelian (A.D. 270-275) defeated the Goths, thus securing the frontiers against major Germanic raids for another century. For some of the barbarians, defeat meant destruction of their social identity. The Roman army was often vicious in pursuing and destroying tribes and their villages and selling survivors into slavery.

For warriors who surrendered, they were often sent in small groups throughout the empire and were assimilated into the Roman army. More common than total destruction was the reconstitution of the people in much the same form as before, but with certain obligations toward Rome as foederati. As such, they pledged they would defend Rome’s frontiers, provide troops when needed to the Roman army and, sometimes, to provide supplies.

The third century saw the emergence of many new barbarian groups, “peoples” such as the Franks (“the Fierce” or “the Free”) or the Alamanni (“the People”), neither of which could be traced to older, “ancient” peoples. Modern historians were wedded to theories of ethnological homogeneity and sought to discover and explain the origins of these groups as being splinters of larger groups mentioned by Tacitus. In fact, these were entirely new confederations of people located, in the case of the Franks, generally around the lower Rhine, and the Alamanni, generally around the upper Rhine.

Beyond the Franks and Alamanni lay still other groups. The Burgundians and Saxons, neighbors to the Alamanni and the Franks, respectively, were new tribes who had assumed old names. In the case of the Burgundians, it would be impossible to believe that all came from Bornholm and more likely that, as observed by Lucien Musset, that only the “nucleus” of this tribe, “the bearers of its traditions,” had originally come from this place.

UP NEXT: The Probus and the Burgundians

SOURCES:

Todd, Northern Barbarians.
C.D. Gordon, “Subsidies in Roman Imperial Defence.”
Geary, The Myth of Nations.
Musset, The Germanic Invasions.

Monday, March 9, 2009

Evolution of Barbarian Arms and Tactics


During the first and second centuries A.D., the Germanic armies were primarily made up of foot soldiers armed with lances, spears, shields and only a few swords. Some Eastern Germans also probably used the axe. Very little body armor or helmets were worn. Most warriors fought naked or in little clothing and often wore just trousers or a short tunic and shoes. A shield was often carried and was used as both an offensive and a defensive weapon. Horses were not prevalent, and were used mostly by those tribes nearer to the Roman frontier than in the interior. However, even though most tribes lacked cavalry, their infantry prized speed above all else as an essential tactic against the more heavily armored Romans. Further, during the first two centuries of contact between the Germans and Rome there was little change in Germanic armament or tactics.

From the time of the Marcomannic Wars (166 to 180 A.D.), however, changes began to take place. Roman types of equipment acquired as booty or because of service in the Roman army became more prevalent amongst the Germans. Use of axes and bows and arrows also increased. Swords were common and German smiths often copied captured Roman swords, especially the long, double-edged spatha and the shorter, broad gladius. Roman swords were also imported more at the beginning of the third century, especially into the region between the Oder and Vistula rivers.


The barbarians were not well-schooled in siege warfare and lacked the knowledge to build adequate siege weapons. From the third century B.C. to the second century A.D., Germanic weaponry evolved little. Increasing contact with Rome changed that. By the fourth century, the armament of the Romans and Germans were often indistinguishable, largely because the Roman army itself was largely composed of Germans. Finally, while weapons and armor did change, the hit and run tactics of the ambush and the quick raid on a weak target were still preferred by the tribes.

Thus, the first phase of the “barbarian invasions,” which implied a violent struggle “between the civilized Roman citizens of the provinces and uncivilized intruders from outside the empire,” (Whittaker) were in actuality a slow merging of peoples along the border. There were battles, but these were as much between each other as they were against Roman settlements. Eventually, along the limes, the members of the two groups, Roman and German, were nearly indistinguishable from each other, with the Romans assuming many characteristics of the Germans. This has been supported by archeological evidence. Grave goods found in and near the frontier were similar to others found in the graves of Saxons, Franks and Alamani beyond the frontier. There was an especially marked similarity in the brooches discovered in women’s graves from both regions.

The various belts, buckles and military insignia discovered indicated an obvious link to Rome. Further, the inclusion of weapons in the graves seem to be only in those burials of people within the Empire and not among external Germans. This indicated a frontier culture of people “associated with Romans, possibly through military service” (Whitaker). Additionally, as Patrick Geary explained, by the third century, legions, including the many barbarians in them, could marry legally (though many had informally for quite some time) and many, if not most, of their wives were drawn from the local population. This facilitated the assimilation of soldiers into specific localities.

For these reasons, C.R. Whitaker makes two conclusions. First “the change was not sudden” and second the barbarians and the Romans dwelling on the limes had more in common than previously thought. Even children’s graves contained swords and other martial implements and it is probable that not all of the graves were of Germans, “since in Gaul many of these burials appear to be perfectly integrated in provincial communities, using the same graveyards without signs of disruption.” According to Edward James, archeology has also revealed that “the settlements of Visigoths, Franks, and Burgundians in the fifth century, which [were] marked on maps, are really not distinguishable in terms of new cultures coming into Gaul from beyond the frontiers.” As Geary observed, “[a] man or woman with a Lombard-style brooch is no more necessarily a Lombard than a family in Bradford with a Toyota is Japanese; artifacts are no secure guide to ethnicity.”

UP NEXT: End of the Limes

SOURCES:

Todd, Northern Barbarians.
Whittaker, Frontiers of the Roman Empire.
Geary, The Myth of Nations.
Edward James, “The Merovingian archaeology of south-west Gaul,” British Archaeological Reports, Suppl. Series 25, (Oxford, 1977).
Chris Wickham, Early Medieval Italy: Central Power and Local Society 400-1000, (Totowa, N.J., 1981).

Sunday, March 1, 2009

Germanic Contact with the Roman Empire - Conflict and Commerce

The Roman trade policy did gradually establish a certain, albeit inconsistent, cultural equivalency between the Empire and the barbarians. However, it also caused conflict within individual tribes as both competition for favors from Rome and between pro- and anti-Roman factions splintered old tribes and formed new ones based on relationships to Rome. These factions resorted to violence to press their case, some at the behest of Rome, which had the money so desirable to barbarian leaders. These leaders held, or desired, political power that was acquired and reinforced through their ability to control trade in their region. As C.R. Whitaker surmised, "It is reasonable to conclude that soldiers, particularly officers, on active service became increasingly powerful locally through their attachment to the land in the regions where they served."

Thus, the result of Roman and barbarian interaction along the limes was a destabilization. Rome, with her money and political power, enabled some chiefs to gain riches previously unimagined. More importantly, these chiefs were trained in the politics and economics of Rome and were able apply these principles successfully among their tribes. At the same time, those barbarian groups not embraced by Rome often grouped into large confederations and wreaked havoc along the borderlands. These new groups formed and re-formed continually, some around a strong, Romanized barbarian and others around a particular leader at the head of a barbarian confederation. These new “tribes” often associated themselves with much older traditions for the sake of unity and continuity.

The incessant barbarian conflicts that occurred during the latter part of the second century increased the importance of the military leaders in the tribes. As Patrick Geary observed, these reiks often attributed their military prowess as “a sign of the gods’ favor,” which enabled them to “add a religious aura to their position.”

The god Tiwaz was a war god (his rune is to the left), influential on the battlefield, but was also more importantly the god of law and order and was associated with the Germanic Thing, the essential governing body of a traditional tribe. As the tribe began to identify itself less with its land of origin, it also de-emphasized the role of the god Tiwaz, and the thiudans, and identified itself more with the new, successful war leader and the corresponding god of war, Woden.

According to Geary, “[v]ictories created new traditions,” and, according to Malcolm Todd, regardless of race, language, or political origin, if an individual fought along side a certain war leader, he was a member of that war leader’s tribe. Geary also believes that the Marcomannic Wars were evidence of “a radical restructuring of the Germanic world” and “the last decades of the second century were the most vital period of ethnogenesis in Germanic history.”

Barbarians had been used by Rome for her armies almost from their first exposure to the Empire. Caesar used Germanic troops during his Gaul campaign. Initially serving as separate, tribe-based auxiliary forces, they were eventually merged into the general Roman auxiliary forces. Some were picked to be special body guards for the emperor, which formed an important political counterweight to the Praetorian Guard. Most important were the German leaders who learned the Roman way of war and brought their knowledge back to their tribes. Barbarian war-leaders also identified themselves as both members of barbarian society and Roman officers and often used one position to advance the other. Some, such as Arbogast, used their position as Roman generals to marshal the necessary forces to attack their barbarian rivals, as Arbogast did by attacking Marcomer and Sunno across the Rhine. However, most often, accepting a high position in the Roman army usually meant forfeiting tribal political power.

Roman money was important, especially to the barbarian leader, because victory alone could not maintain a king’s prestige against other leaders in the tribe. Money equaled power, and Rome had a seemingly endless supply of the former. In exchange for money, barbarian kings provided Rome with military manpower. They used Roman money and booty acquired while pursuing Roman military ventures to satisfy their supporters and attract more warriors to their tribe. As such, military leaders did not rely solely on strict tribal bonds to attract warriors. Warrior bands, called comitatus, were based on personal loyalty to a leader rather than tribal bonds, and these became prevalent and added to the confusion among tribal society.

Often, individual members of these bands participated in raids against tribes with whom their ancestral tribe was ostensibly at peace. This in turn caused more widespread conflict. Also, when a tribe moved, and inevitably encountered and fought other tribes, a natural upward social mobility occurred within its ranks as warriors proved themselves on the battlefield. Skill was prime, not ethnic or social background, and those that distinctly exhibited these characteristics emerged as leaders. This near-constant state of warfare resulted in the splintering and reformation of tribes, often with a war leader and his comitatus serving as the nucleus for a new tribe. The war leaders of these new or reformed tribes called upon their own tribal heritage to provide an identity for their new tribe, often recycling remembered and revered tribal names to add an air of authenticity and respect. While probable that the mixed ethnicity of a comitatus could cause problems for a leader, being able to overcome such internal unrest would bolster his reputation. Further, according to Lucien Musset, perhaps the solutions reached by such successful leaders eventually led them "to modify their institutions, and thus pav[ed] the way for an eventual reconciliation with the Romans.”

The Romans did not recruit barbarians for only military purposes. They also settled them on their lands to provide a needed workforce in regions that had been ravaged of their former population by war or famine. These barbarian were usually those who themselves had been defeated in war and were either held by the Romans or had asked the emperor for permission to settle on Roman lands. In exchange, these groups paid tribute and lived under Roman law, though they were not considered to be freemen and were subject to the emperor’s whim. “Privileges could not be accorded to those whose origin lay beyond the boundaries of the Roman state.” Thus, barbarian workers in the Roman Empire helped to convert uncultivated land into cultivated and taxable land and provided manpower for other endeavors, such as mining.

This constant state of societal flux as tribes formed, splintered, and re-formed both within and outside of lands under imperial control has revealed that tribes “were more processes than stable structures.” In essence, the tribes were similar to modern political parties. Each exalted a founding father, or concept, and included people and families of different ethnic stock, but shared cultural values. Additionally, given the inability of the Germans to act in concert at the tribal level, the traditional belief that they had acted in concert to raid the Roman Empire en masse has been shown as incorrect.

Geary has argued that the Romans applied a faulty template to the Germanic tribes in an attempt to put a familiar societal structure over the chaotic Germanic tribal world, which strengthened the perception that Germans were both similar and even united in action. Further, Walter Goffart has concluded that this faulty theory of united Germanic action led to the belief that Germanic tribes consciously set out to set up kingdoms on Roman soil and these mistaken assumptions contributed to the flawed motif of Barbarian Invasions. It also implied that a single, united German entity opposed the Roman Empire and that both entities were conscious of being on opposing sides. Conversely, Peter Heather asserts that, while the independent Germanic tribes didn’t act in concert to attack the Roman Empire, the widespread displacement caused by the Huns effectively produced this effect. Finally, Malcolm Todd observes that while:

...the history of the Germanic peoples in the fourth and fifth centuries, particularly in western Europe, is inextricably bound up with that of the declining Roman provinces… the tale is by no means always one of destruction and waste. Barbarians were by this time better equipped for life inside the empire than most ancient writers believed.


UP NEXT: Evolution of Barbarian Arms and Tactics

SOURCES:
Geary, Before France and Germany.
Goffart, Barbarians and Romans.
Ralph Whitney Mathisen, Roman Aristocrats in Barbarian Gaul: Strategies for Survival in an Age of Transition (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993).
Whittaker, Frontiers of the Roman Empire.
Todd, The Northern Barbarians.
Musset, Germanic Invasions.
Miroslava Mirkovic, “The Later Roman Colonate and Freedom,” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 87, no.2 (1997).
Peter Heather, in “The Huns and the End of the Roman Empire in Western Europe,” The English Historical Review 110, no.435 (1995).

Sunday, February 22, 2009

Germanic Contact with the Roman Empire - Life Along the Limes



Though their early history has remained clouded, Burgundian contact with Rome has enabled a better understanding of how Burgundian society evolved. After initial attempts during the first and early second century to penetrate beyond the Rhine and Danube, Rome created an artificial frontier, the limes, between the empire and the barbarians. This frontier stretched from the Rhine north of Koblenz to the Danube valley near Regensburg.

The area immediately to the east of the limes was settled by barbarians, perhaps under a treaty with Rome. The Romans also saw the importance of rivers in connecting Rome with this frontier.

Source (original link now defunct)

While historians once thought that the rivers formed a sort of border, it has become recognized that these rivers were not political limits but the outer limit of logistical support for the empire. The forts on rivers such as the Danube and Rhine were supply depots, not defensive installations, though they would sometimes serve that purpose. Thus, the limes served less as a barrier to barbarian invasion, and more as a “free trade zone” shared with the barbarians. It was indeed a frontier rather than a border.

The rivers were the avenue by which needed supplies were sent to support the Roman army and to trade with the barbarians. Supply was necessary because the surrounding lands were not sufficient to support the Roman army.

The limes were the areas in which the greatest amount of commerce between the Romans and barbarians occurred. Exposure to Roman culture through trade resulted in a fundamental change in Germanic society.


Rome believed trade was a stabilizing force that could civilize the barbarians. Roman leadership hoped that the barbarians would come to rely and value Roman goods to the extent that any disruption in trade, such as by raids or war, would end. Apart from trade, Roman policy also allowed for the liberal dispensing of gifts to achieve the desired results. These Roman policies of trading and gift-giving were followed with three goals in mind, according to C.D. Gordon (“Subsidies in Roman Imperial Defence,” Phoenix 3, no.2 (1949): 67-68): “to buy alliance and active military help against more formidable enemies; to buy immunity from attack; and to create division among the enemies of the empire so as to maintain the frontiers intact.” Gordon also noted:

Of considerable interest are the effects which this policy had on external trade and the internal economy of the Empire, and on the barbarians who received the subsidies. Recent history has many examples of trade agreements by which one government has lent or given large sums to another government for purposes that will benefit both. The Canadian and American credits and loans to Europe have not been made in a spirit of pure philanthropy, but with the idea, among others, of stimulating the home industries by providing purchasing power for local products in foreign countries. Without imagining that Rome ever paid subsidies with this in mind, we can see that the sending of Roman money to foreigners must have helped the Roman export trade, especially to the barbarian north which had so great a need for Roman manufactures.

In accomplishing these goals the Roman policy was, at least initially, successful for both sides. The trade and subsidies had the desirable economic effects on the Germanic people. The Germans along the borderlands became accustomed to the quality of Roman goods and they also converted to a money economy. Cassius Dio, governor on the Danube in the early third century A.D. remarked:

The barbarians were adapting themselves to the Roman world. They were setting up markets and peaceful meetings, although they had not forgotten their ancestral habits, their tribal customs, their independent life, and the freedom that came from weapons. However, as long as they learned these different habits gradually and under some sort of supervision, they did not find it difficult to change their life, and they were becoming different without realizing it.

In turn, they brought this new style of trade to the Germans deeper in the interior. The result was a slow cultural “equalizing” between the Germanic peoples along the limes and those in the interior. However, equalizing didn't equal stabilizing.

UP NEXT: Conflict and Commerce

SOURCES:
Todd, The Northern Barbarians.
Stephen L. Dyson, The Creation of the Roman Frontier, (Princeton , N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985).
Whittaker, Frontiers of the Roman Empire.
C.D. Gordon, “Subsidies in Roman Imperial Defence,” Phoenix 3, no.2 (1949).
Cassius Dio, Roman History, 56.18.2

Sunday, January 4, 2009

Characteristics of Early Germanic Migrations

Although it has been generally accepted that those we refer to as the Germans moved from their original lands into Western Europe, the reasons for which they did so continues to be debated. As Herwig Wolfram (The Roman Empire and Its Germanic Peoples) pithily observed, the “[d]ebates concerning the Germanic identity of the Germanic tribes who lived east of the Rhine fill entire libraries.” The most questionable early historical discussions centered on attempts to pinpoint the specific migratory path of certain Germanic tribes. Yet, as C.R. Whittaker (Frontiers of the Roman Empire: A Social and Economic Study) cautioned:

We have to break away from the stereotypes of ‘tribal’ history and mass movements of tribal migration, which, when we can trace them archaeologically…seem to be slow movements of infiltration by small groups of warriors.

Originally, historians believed that the Burgundians were among what came to be classified as the East Germans. These tribes left their lands beyond the Elbe River in the third and fourth centuries in search of new lands on a journey that took them towards the Black Sea and the Danube. Historians hypothesized that growing population and a related need for better food resources, as well as migratory pressure from other tribes, were probably the motivating factors in East German migration. Two good examples of this traditional theory are in Bury's Invasion of Europe Gibbon's The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. Both Gibbon and Bury thought the wars fought by Marcus Aurelius during the end of the second century provided evidence for the movement of the East Germans because, they concluded, the barbarians Aurelius fought had been displaced by migrating East Germans.

These theories are still generally sound, though the attempt to specify migratory paths has been criticized by historians such as Walter Goffart (Barbarians and Romans. Additionally, Herwig Wolfram (Germanic Peoples) discounted the role of hunger or desire for goods as motivation for the migrations. Instead, he attributed pressure from constant warfare within barbarian society. According to Wolfram, this constant warfare was a direct result of “the driving force of tribal life [which] was the pathos of heroism. Barbarian traditions are the tales of the ‘deeds of brave men’—only the warrior matters; tribe and army are one.”

More recent scholarship has relied primarily on archeological evidence and has re-classified the Burgundians as Elbe Germans (Geary in Before France and Germany). Wolfram (Germanic Peoples) noted that linguists used to consider the Burgundians as East Germans, but are no longer so sure. The Burgundians were traditionally classified as a Gothic people, but this may have been because they were Arian Christians. Sidonius himself considered them to be Germanic, not Goths, a classification that a contemporary ethnographer would not confuse, according to Wolfram.

Their appearance in written sources clearly indicates that a Germanic tribe known as Burgundians existed, though their specific migration route remains unknown. As Malcolm Todd (Everyday Life of The Barbarians: Goths, Franks, and Vandals) argues, it is impossible to link a tribe mentioned by Tacitus and others of that era with so-called “archeological cultures” and most modern archeologists “prefer to leave on one side questions concerning the ethnic significance of archeological mater.” For his part, Todd placed the Burgundians among an eastern group of Germans, living between the Oder and Vistula, with the Goths, Vandals and Rugii.

An analysis of the few Burgundian remains, primarily skulls, indicated characteristics similar to those of people of Asiatic origin. Additionally, some historians have detected Asiatic themes and styles in the artwork of various Germanic tribes, including the Burgundians, during the migration period. Lucien Musset(Germanic Invasions), in particular, mentioned that analysis of Burgundian skulls indicated Asian characteristics and he also pointed out that it had been conjectured that the second part of the name of a later king, Gundiocus (Gundioc), showed Hunnic influence (based on Herbert Kuhn's “Asiatic Influences on the Art of the Migrations,” Parnassus 9).

Other archeological evidence taken from the area around the lower Vistula, traditionally believed to be a home to the Burgundians, indicated that the region experienced a population loss some time toward the end of the third century. Some historians took this as evidence of a western migration of the Burgundians at this time. However, this by itself is not enough to determine the specific migratory movements of the Burgundians.

Todd (The Northern Barbarians) and Patrick Geary (The Myth of Nations) each offer a substantive recounting of the problems associated with relying on nineteenth century interpretations of the history of the Germanic tribes from the time of Caesar to the migration period. Geary detailed how the compilation of the Monumenta Germaniae Historica (MGH) lay at the root of many of these problems as its composition relied heavily on the science of philology which resulted in classifying people according to a language family, from which tribal nationalities were then developed.

UP NEXT: Burgundian Contact with the Roman Empire

SOURCES:
Herwig Wolfram, The Roman Empire and Its Germanic Peoples, trans. Thomas Dunlap (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1997).
C.R. Whittaker, Frontiers of the Roman Empire: A Social and Economic Study (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).
Bury, Invasion of Europe.
Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Great Books of the Western World, vol.40-41 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952).
Goffart, Barbarians and Romans.
Patrick Geary, Before France and Germany.
Malcolm Todd, Everyday Life of The Barbarians: Goths, Franks, and Vandals. (New York: Dorset Press, 1972).
Musset, Germanic Invasions.
Herbert Kuhn, “Asiatic Influences on the Art of the Migrations,” Parnassus 9, no.1 (1937).
Todd, The Northern Barbarians.
Patrick Geary, The Myth of Nations.